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Cert. to CA 3 




(with extension ) 
\\~ 1. 
OJ,~~ ht holders of two musical compositions which were broadcast by a ,\·. ,Mvl~ 
Resp owns a chain of fast-food restaurants. Petrs are copy ----
:Y r adio station, received at one of resp's restaurants, and therein 
~ i played for employees and customers over a loudspeaker system) The 
v radio station held an ASCAP license for the br dcast of the works, 
but resp did not. At issue is whether resp's use of the composition 
., - -
- -2-
constituted a "performance" for the purposes of§ 1 of the Copy r i ght 
Act, 17 u.s.c. § 1. Petrs rely on Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 
283 U.S. 191 (1931); resp supports CA 3's conclusion that the Jewell 
test was rejected in the CATV decisions, Fortnightly Corp v. United 
Artists, 392 U.S. 390 (1968), and Teleprompter Corp v. CBS, 415 U.S. 
394 (1974). 
2. FACTS: Over 5000 commercial establishments are licensed by 
- -------------- ...... -tr 
ASCAP, at $5 per month, to entertain their customers and employees 
with radio music played over loudspeaker systems. The licenses also 
~ 
cover the use of tapes and records. They are not required if the 
- radio music is played over a single standard radio rece~ver and is 
not channeled into auxiliary speakers. Fees for these licenses 
constitute less than o.4% of ASCAP's revenues. However, ASCAP's 
ability to require licenses has some unknown effect on the fees it 
is able to charge such services as Muzak, whose principal compet i tion 
is in-house radio reception and speaker systems. The latter fees are 
somewhat over $2 million per year, or about 3% of ASCAP's total 
revenues. 
The district court (W.D. Pa. Weiss) concluded tha j: Jewe11) control-
led. That case was a unanimous decision authored by Justice Brandeis, 
and dealt with virtually identical facts (as discussed below, Jewell 
- does differ in that there the radio station was not •itself licensed 
to "perform" the compositions). The DC recognized that Fortnightly 




that this Court would have expressly overruled Jewell had it meant 
to do so. It also relied on the existence of established business 
relationships based on Jewell, on the fact that CATV and radio 
need not necessarily be treated consistently, and on a judicial 
unwillingness to upset a 30-year status quo in an area subject to 
congressional control. 
CA 3 reversed. It acknowledged that Jewell is on· "all fours" 
with this case. It concluded, however, that Fortn1ghtly and 
'--------------
Te l eprompter had decreed that Jewell's "quantitative" test (one 
which focuses on how much the alleged infringer does to bring about 
- t he hearing of a copyrighted work) was to be replaced by a "functional" ~ - -
test (one which focuses on whether the alleged infringer functions as 
a b roadcaster or merely as a viewer -- the latter term being broadly 
used to include those who receive broadcast signal.sand extensively 
enh anc_e and redistribute them). CA 3 thought there was no basis for 
// distinguishing between radio and CATV, and noted that in Fortnightly 
this Court approvingly cited Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal --
1929), a pre-Jewell radio case which held that persons such as resp 
do not "perform" when they merely actuate electrical instrumentalities 
which render audible signals which are freely "omnipresent in the 
air." 392 U.S. at 398, n. 24. CA 3 concluded that no "performance" 
- occurred when resp extended the range of audibility of a broadcast 
program through equipment much less elaborate and sophisticated 




3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs rely on Jewell, contending that this 
situation is plainly within its facts even if the CATV cases did 
serve to limit it to its facts. Resps contend that this is a 
different case from Jewell, inasmuch as there the broadcaster was 
not licensed to perform the composition; they note that in 
Fortnightly this Court said: 
"The [Jewell] Court held the hotel liable for 
infr i ngement but noted that the result might 
have diff ered if, as in this case, the 
original b roadcast had been authorized by the 
c opyr i ght holder. 283 U.S. at 199, n.5. The 
Jewe l l-LaSalle decision must be understood as 
limited t o its own facts." 392 U.S. at 397, n. 18. 
- Petr s contend t hat t h i s difference is irrelevant, for two reasons. 
First, _since 1941 t he ASCAP license for broadcasters has expressly 
negated the grant of a n implied license to persons receiving the 
broadcast; second , the -certified question in Jewell was whether 
certain acts constit uted a " performance," and this is a question 
wholly unrelated to whether there was an implied license. 
Petrs contend that the CATV cases are distinguishable in that 
they concerned systems which merely enhance the ability of private 
viewers to receive signals on their private TV sets, whereas here 
the resp functions as an "active" public performer by installing 
and controlling the radio system; from petr's point of view, resp 
- is no different from a restaurant proprietor who plays tapes or 
records, or who hires a band. Resp points out that many cable 




establishments which use the cablecasts for entertainment purposes 
similar to those at issue here. 
Petrs rely heavily on the patterns of b11siness 
that have been established in reliance on Jewell. They contend that 
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), is an example of this Court's 
willingness to vindicate such reliance interests even though 
subsequently-developed law applicable to similar situations may be 
in apparent conflict. They also contend that the Jewell formula 
has been accepted by Congress, by virtue of frequent amendments to 
the Copyright Act without overruling it, and by incorporating it 
- into various proposals to overhaul the copyright laws. 
-
Resp contends that CA 3's decision does not threaten to disrupt 
any existing relationships of the importance of those in Flood. The 
revenues at issue are only a minor portion of ASCAP's total revenues, 
and presumably much of the loss could be recouped by increased 
broadcast license fees. 
4. DISCUSSION: This is an inevitable problem, in light of 
Jewell and the CATV cases. To my mind, it can be reasonably resolved 
in either direction. The strongest argument for the petrs is that 
while the CATV cases may indicate that the wrong test was applied 
in Jewell, concern for established business practices suggests that 
Jewell should not now be directly overruled. See Fortnightly, 390 
U.S. at 401, n. 30. As for resp's distinction of Jewell, this Court's 







Jewell has long been accepted as being applicable to licensed 
broadcasts. See Society of European Stage Authors & Composers v. 
New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1 (SDNY 1937). 
This problem is a creation of this Court, and as a matter of 
legal principle merits this Court's resolution. However, as a 
practical matter, the issue is a good candidate for deferral 
pending further CA consideration or possible Congressional action 
the amount of money involved is fairly small, especially as to any 
one copyright holder, and CA 3's decision is not an unreasonable 
interpretation of the effect of the CATV cases. 
There is a response. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ron Carr DATE: April 22, 1975 
No. 74-452 - Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken 
I recormnend that you vote to affirm. It seems to 
me clear beyond question that, analytically, Buck v. Jewell-
LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931), on the one side, and, 
on the other, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 
392 U.S. 390 (1968) and Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 
(1974), cannot stand together. Moreover, in all points relevant 
to its rationale, Jewell-LaSalle is squarely controlling in 
this case and would require reversal here - i.~., a holding of 
infringement. On the other side, the rationale of Fortnightly 
and Teleprompter also would seem controlling, there being no 
salient difference, in point of doctrine, between those cases 
and this. Fortnightly-Teleprompter would, of course, require 
affirmance here, and, hence an at least implicit overruling 
of Jewell-LaSalle. 
You could vote, however, to reaffirm the vitality of 
Jewell-LaSalle, even though it conflicts with Fortnightly-
Teleprompter, simply on stare decisis grounds similar to those 
relied on in Flood v. Kuhn. The argument for this position 







Fortnightly-Teleprompter's rationale, its result should 
continue to govern the particular problem with which it dealt : 
use by commercial establishments, i.e., restaurants and hotels, 
of radio (and preslllilably television) broadcasts of copyrighted 
materials. In matters of statutory construction, the role of 
stare decisis is more powerful than it is with respect to, say, 
constitutional interpretation, since, if the result in a 
case is inconsistent with congressional intent, Congress could 
overrule it by enacting statutory reform. Here Congress has, 
on several occasions, declined to overrule Jewell-LaSalle. 
Moreover, the Court's overruling of its previous statutory 
construction would disrupt long-standing business relationships 
arranged in justified reliance on the prior decision. This 
was not the case with respect to the CATV problems presen ted 
in Fortnightly-Teleprompter, since those problems involved 
an entirely new industry and, of necessity, a new application 
of the Copyright Law. It is the case with respect to the 
problem presented here. If the Jewell-LaSalle rule needs 
reform, it should be accomplished by Congress. 
The weakness of this arglllilent here, I think, is that 
Jewell-LaSalle has already, in practical effect, been over-
ruled by Fortnightly. The CATV problem dealt with in 
Fortnightly is indi stinguishable in point of economic dimensions 






hotel problem. Fortnightly, of course, adopts a functional 
test - whether the copyright use is closer to that of a 
broadcaster or viewer-listener, and this test is fundamentally 
i nconsistent with Jewell-LaSalle's quantitative test - whether 
the use, for-profit, increases the number of auditors or viewers 
of the broadcasted, copyright materials. The functional test 
was considered, but rejected in Jewell-LaSalle; the quantitative 
test was considered, but rejected, in Fortnightlx, which 
expressly limited Jewell-LaSalle to its facts, and more specifically 
to the fact that, there, the original broadcast had not been 
licensed by the copyright holder. 392 U.S. at 396 n. 18. 
Congress has allowed Fortnightly, with its obvious limitations 
on Jewell-LaSalle, to stand for seven years. Hence, it can be 
argued that after Fortnightly, continued reliance on Jewell-LaSalle 
was misplaced. 
I 
More importantly, however, I think that Fortnightly 
may have been rightly dec ~ded, as an economic matter. As we 
discussed so extensively with respect to the Williams & Wilkins 
case, the Copyright Law inevitably involves a trade-off between 
the widest possible dissemination of the copyright holder's 
work and t he necessity of supplying economic incentives to 
induce the c opyright holder to produce the work in the first 
place. The Copyright Law mandates that the copyright holder be 
able to extract a monopoly profit for his work. But there are, 
u/-








monopoly profit; the less efficient the method - in economic 
terms, the greater the transaction costs - the more costly 
it will be for the public to gain access to and benefit from 
the work. Moreover, high transaction costs do not necessarily 
increase the copyright holder's compensation and, hence, do not 
advance the legitimate purposes of the Copyright Law. In 
deciding whether a particular use should be deemed an 
infringement, the Court's proper focus, it seems to me, should 
be on the following question: at what point in the process 
should the copyright holder's monopoly profit be extracted, 
in order to ensure that the holder gets full advantage of the 
copyright, but at the lowest possible transaction costs? 
Fortnightly's functional analysis and, more particularly, 
its result is consistent with the economic approach outlined above. 
So long as the full monopoly profit can be extracted at one 
'--- ~ -
point, it is more efficient that it be done at that point, 
rather than at multiple points later in the process. Thus, it 
is more efficient that, as in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, 
the monopoly profit be collected from the original broadcaster -
and collected in full, its value determined by the predicted 
number of viewers/auditors - than at a later point in the process 
from numerous intermediaries who enhance the number of persons 
in the listening or viewing market. The important point is 






be collected in full, but that transaction costs increase in 
proportion to the number of collections that have to be made. 
So, here, it may be that ASCAP's license fee to radio 
stations is lower becuase, under Jewell-LaSalle, it can also 
collect from individual business establishments that use the 
broadcasts of copyrighted material to entertain their customers. 
It would, I think, probably be wrong to s uggest th~t by 
collecting from both the radio stations and individual 
businesses, ASCAP is collecting two monopoly profits for the 
same use. There may, however, be some slippage due to 
information problems, so that the broadcaster-licensees and the 
individual business establishments do pay somewhat more than a 
single monopoly profit for the radio licensee's use. The more 
important problem, however, is transaction costs. Collecting 
from multiple business establishments costs far more than 
collecting the full profit from the original broadcaster. If, 
therefore, it can be said thatASCAP is collecting from both 
the broadcaster and the business establishments for the same 
use, then the economically sound course would be for the Court 
to allow a charge only to the broadcaster, and, in effect, to 
require ASCAP to increase that charge to the extent necessary 
to extract the full monopoly profit. 
Broadcasters (except in the case of specialized enterprises 






willing to pay a license fee for use of the copyright because 
such use enhances the value of their advertisers' product. 
Thus, to the extent that enterprises like the CATV stations in 
Fortnightly and Mr. Aiken's restaurant increase the broadcaster's 
audience - both for the copyrighted work and the advertisement -
that fact will be reflected in the amount that advertisers will 
be willing to pay copyright holders. Moreover, the advertiser 
will be willing to pay for use by all auditors, including 
those who, in economic effect, rent their listening equipment 
from restaurants and hotels, as well as those who listen by 
means of rented or purchased equipment in their own homes. 
Since the monopoly profit for use by all auditors can be 
collected from advertisers, it would be less efficient to 
allow it to be collected in part from advertisers and in part 
from equipment renters like Mr. Aiken and most CATV stations. 
;'( 
* I should point out that, on this analysis, Teleerompter 
was, on its facts, wrongly decided. Some of the CATV stations 
in Tele1rompter eliminated the local advertisements included in origina broadcasts of distant origin and substituted local 
advertisements of their own. Even had they not done this, however, 
the original broadcaster's local advertisers would not be willing 
to pay an increased fee for the market extension caused by CATV. 
Hence, the copyright holder could not extract the full monopoly 
profit from the original broadcaster and, I think, should have been 
allowed to collect from the CATV stations as well. Indeed, because 
of the local advertiser problem, an argument can be made that 
l 
the Fortnightly-Teleprompter rule makes more sense in the context 







I think, therefore, that in light of the purposes 
of the Copyright Law, the Fortnightly approach is probably 
correct, at least as applied to the circumstances here. First, 
Mr. Aiken does not attempt to eliminate advertisements from 
the broadcasts he plays in his restaurant. Second, the consumers 
served by Mr. Aiken are presumably among those of interest 
to the broadcaster's advertisers. 
Jewell-LaSalle could, of course, be flat-out overruled. 
But I think the better course is a variant of that taken in 
Fortnightly itself. As noted above, Fortnightly distinguished 
Jewell-LaSalle on the ground that, there, the broadcaster was 
not himself licensed. This distinction relies on a fact that 
was not at all essential to Jewell-LaSalle's rationale, as 
Justice Fortas, in his Fortnightly dissent, pointed out. 
Nonetheless, the distinction makes some sense. If the broadcaster 
is not licensed, then the copyright holder is receiving W 1'.0 
, - ...........__ ..... c _ 
recompense from the use of his work - whether from the broad-
--------- intermediaries like hotels and restaurants, caster h imself, or, 
most importantly, from the ultimate conslllller. Thus, it is not 
inequitable to allow the copyright holder to collect at some 
point in the chain, perhaps on a contributory infringement theory. 
But when, as here, it can be assumed that the copyright 
holder can collect from the broadcaster for all use by all 
auditors, then it seems to me sensible that Fortnightly should 
control, and that the copyright holder be required to collect 
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1st DRAFT ------
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
No. 74-4.52 
Twentieth Century Music 




On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit. 
[Jurn~ -, 1975] 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The question presented by this case is whether the 
reception of a radio broadcast of a copyrighted musical 
composition can constitute copyright infringement, when 
the copyright owner has licensed the broadcaster to per-
form the composition publicly for profit. 
I 
The respondent George Aiken owns and operates a 
small fast-service food shop in downtown Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, known as "George Aiken's Chicken." 
There are no waiters or waitresses in the conventional 
sense. The food is simple and reasonably priced. Some 
customers carry out the food they purchase and eat it 
elsewhere, while others remain in the establishment and 
eat at counters or booths. Usually the "carry-out" cus-
tomers are in the restaurant for less than five minutes, 
and those who eat there seldom remain longer than 10 
or 15 minutes. 
A radio with outlets to four speakers in the ceiling 
receives broadcasts of music and other normal radio pro-





2 TWENTIETH CENTURY CORP. v. AIKEN 
radio each morning at the start of business. Music, 
news, entertainment, and commercial advertising broad-
cast by radio stations are thus heard by Aiken, his em-
ployees, and his customers during the hours that the 
establishment is open for business. 
On March 11, 1972, broadcasts of two copyrighted 
musical compositions were received on the radio from a 
local station while several customers were in Aiken's 
establishment. Petitioner Twentieth Century Music 
Corporation owns the copyright on one of these songs, 
"The More I See You"; petitioner Mary Bourne the 
copyright on the other, "Me and My Shadow." Peti-
tioners are members of the American Society of Com-
posers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), an association 
that licenses the performing rights of its members to 
their copyrighted works. The station that broadcast the 
petitioners' songs was licensed by ASCAP to broadcast 
them.1 Aiken, however, did not hold a license from 
ASCAP. 
The petitioners sued Aiken in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to 
recover for copyright infringement. Their complaint 
alleged that the radio reception in Aiken's restaurant of 
the licensed broadcasts infringed their exclusive rights to 
"perform" their copyrighted works in public for profit. 
1 For a discussion of ASCAP, see K-91, Inc . v. Gershwin Pub-
lishing Corp., 372 F. 2d 1 (CA9) . 
ASCAP's license agreement with the Pittsburgh broadcasting sta-
t ion contained, as is customary, the following provision: 
"Nothing herein contained shall be construed as authorizing 
Licensee [WKJF-FM] to grant to others any right to reproduce 
or perform publicly for profit by any means, method or process 
whatsoever of the musical compos1t10ns licensed hereunder or as 
authorizing any :-eceiver of any rad10 broadcast to perform publicly 




TWENTIETH CENTURY CORP. v. AIKEN 3 
The District Judge agreed, and granted statutory mone-
tary awards for each infringement. 356 F. Supp. 271. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reversed that judgment, 500 F. 2d 127, holding that 
the petitioners' claims against the respondent were fore-
closed by this Court's decisions in Fortnightly Corp. v. 
United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, and Teleprompter Corp. v. 
CBS, 415 U. S. 394. We granted certiorari. - U. S. 
II 
The Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, as amended, 
17 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.,2 gives to a copyright holder a 
monopoly limited to specified "exclusive" rights in his 
copyrighted works. 3 As the Court explained in Fort~ 
nightly Corp. v. United Artists, supra: 
"The Copyright Act does not give a copyright 
2 The Constitution gives Congress the power "To promote the 
Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries." U. S. Const ., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. See, 
e. g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 58; 
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94. 
8 17 U.S. C. § 1 provides: 
"Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions 
of this title, shall have the exclusive right : 
"(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted 
work; 
"(b) To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or 
dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work; 
to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work ; to convert it into a 
novel or other nondramatic work 1f 1t be a drama; to arrange or 
adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish 
it if it be a model or design for a work of art; 
" ( c) To deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present the 
copyrighted work in public for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, 
address or similar production, or other nondramatic literary work ; 
1,0 make or procure the making of any transcription or record thereof 
- -
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holder control over all uses of his copyrighted work. 
Instead, § 1 of the Act enumerates several 'rights' 
that are made 'exclusive' to the holder of the copy-
right. If a person, without authorization from the 
copyright holder, puts a copyrighted work to a use 
within the scope of one of these 'exclusive rights,' 
he infringes the copyright. If he puts the work to 
a use not enumerated in § 1, he does not infringe." 
Id., at 393-395. 
Accordingly, if an unlicensed use of a copyrighted 
work does not conflict with an "exclusive" right con .. 
£erred by the statute, it is no infringement of the holder's 
by or from which, in whole or in par~, it may in any manner or by 
any method be exhibited, delivered , presented, produced, or re~ 
produced; and to play or perform it in public for profit, and to 
exhibit, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any 
method whatsoever. The damages for the infringement by broad-
cast of any work referred to in this subsection shall not exceed the 
sum of $100 where the infringing broadcaster shows that he was not 
aware that he was infringing and that such infringement could not 
have been reasonably foreseen; and 
" ( d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if 
it be a drama or, if it be a dramatic work and not reproduced in 
copies for sale, to vend any manuscript or any record whatsoever 
thereof; to make or to procure the making of any transcription or 
record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, 1t may in 
any manner or by any method be exhibited, performed, represented, 
produced, or reproduced; and to exhibit, perform, represent, pro-
duce or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever; 
and 
"(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be 
a musical composition ; and for the purpose of public performance 
for profit, and for the purposes set forth in subsection (a) hereof, 
to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in 
any system of notation or any form of record in which the thought 
of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read ol' 
reproduced ... :" 17 U S. C. § 1. 
- -
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rights. No license is required by the Copyright Act, for 
example, to sing a copyrighted lyric in the shower.4 
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory 
monopoly, like the limited temporal duration of a copy-
right monopoly required by the Constitution,5 reflects a 
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: 
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but 
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of 
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, 
and the other arts.6 The immediate effect of our copy- I 
right law is to secure a fair return for an "author's" ' 
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incen-
tive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public 
good. "The sole interest of the United States and the 
primary object in conferring the monopoly," this Court 
has said, "lie in the general benefits derived by the pub-
lic from the labors of authors." Fox Film Corp. v. 
Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127. See Kendall v. Winsor, 21 
How. 322, 327-328; Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 241-
242. When technological change has rendered its literal 
4 Cf. Wall v. Taylor, 11 W. B. D . 106-107 (1882) (Brett, M. R.): 
"Singing for one's own gratification without intending thereby to 
represent anything, or to amuse anyone else, would not, I think, be 
either a representation or a performance, according to the ordinary 
meaning of those terms, nor would the fact of some other person 
being in the room at the time of ::;uch singing make it so .... " 
<> See M. Nimmer, Copyright § 5 (1974) . 
6 Lord Mansfield's statement of the problem almost 200 years 
ago in Sa.yre v. Moore, 1 East 361n, 102 Eng. Rep. 139n. (K. B. 
1785) bears repeating: 
"[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally 
prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their 
time for the service of the commumty, may not be deprived of their 
just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labor ; the other. 
that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor th~ 
-progress of the arts be retarded." 
- -
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terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed 
in light of this basic purpose.7 
The precise statutory issue in the present case is 
whether Aiken infringed upon the petitioners' exclusive 
right, under the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat.1075, 
asamended, 17 U.S. C. § 1 (e), "[t]o perform the copy-
righted work publicly for profit." 8 We may assume 
that the radio reception of the musical compositions 
in Aiken's restaurant occurred "publicly for profit." See 
Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U. S. 591. The dispositive ques-
tion, therefore, is whether this radio reception constituted 
a "performance" of the copyng te works. 
,..-~ tatutory provision was enacted in 1909, 
its purpose was to prohibit unauthorized performances 
of copyrighted musical compositions in such public places 
as concert halls, theaters, restaurants, and cabarets. See 
H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909). An 
orchestra or individual instrumentalist or singer who 
performs a copyrighted musical composition in such a 
public place without a license is thus clearly an infringer 
under the statute. The entrepreneur who sponsors such 
a public performance for profit is also an infringer-
direct or contributory. See generally M. Nimmer, 
Copyright §§ 102, 134 (1974). But it was never con-
templated that the members of the audience who heard 
the composition would themselves also be simultaneously 
7 In F01·tnightly Corp . v. United Arti,sts, 392 U. S. 390, the Court 
stated: 
"[O]ur inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legis-
lative history, for this is a statute that was drafted long before the 
development of the electronic phenomena with which we deal here. 
In 1909 radio itself was in its mfancy, and television had not been 
invented . We must read the statutory la-nguage of 60 years ago 
in the light of drastic technological change." Id., at 395-396 (foot-
notes omitted). 
8 Seen. 2, supra. 
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"performing," and thus also guilty of infringement . 
This much is common ground. 
With the advent of commercial radio, a broadcast mu-
sical composition could be heard instantaneously by an 
enormous audience of distant and separate persons oper-
ating their radio receiving sets to reconvert the broad-
cast to audible form .9 Although Congress did not revise 
the statutory language, copyright law was quick to adapt 
to prevent the exploitation of protected works through 
the new electronic technology. In short, it was soon 
established in the federal courts that the broadcast of a 
copyrighted musical composition by a'"commerciai radio 
station w~e of that composition 
for profi t-:-and thus an infringement of the copyright 
if not licensed. In one of tha earliest cases so holding, 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals said : 
"While the fact that the radio was not developed 
at the time the Copyright Act (Comp. St. §§ 9517-
9524, 9530-9584) was enacted may raise some q ues-
tion as to whether it properly comes within the 
purview of the statute, it is not by that fact alone 
excluded from the statute. In other words, the 
statute may be applied to new situations not antici-
pated by Congress, if, fairly construed, such situa-
tions come within its intent and meaning. . . . While 
statutes should not be stretched to apply to new 
situations not fairly within their scope, they should 
not be so narrowly construed as to permit their 
evasion because of changing habits due to new in-
ventions and discoveries. 
9 Stat ion KDKA, established in Pittsburgh in 1920, is said to 
have been the fi rst commercial radio broadcasting station in the 
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"A performance, in our judgment, is no less public 
because the listeners are unable to communicate 
with one another, or are not assembled within an 
inclosure, or gathered together in some open stadium 
or park or other public place. Nor can a perform-
ance, in our judgment, be deemed private because 
each listener may enjoy it alone in the privacy of 
his home. Radio broadcasting is intended to, and 
in fact does, reach a very much larger number of the 
public at the moment of the rendition than any 
other medium of performance. The artist is consci-
ously addressing a great, though unseen and widely 
scattered, audience, and is therefore participating 
in a public performance. 
"That, under the Copyright Act, a public per-
formance may be for profit, though no admission 
fee is exacted or no profit actually made, is settled 
by Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U. S. 591, 37 S. Ct. 232, 
61 L. Ed. 511. It suffices, as there held. that the 
purpose of the performance be for profit, and not 
eleemosynary; it is against a commercial, as distin-
guished from a purely philanthropic, public use 
of another's composition, that the statute is di-
rected .... " Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American 
Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F. 2d 411-412 (1925). 
See also M·. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 
F. 776 (NJ 1923); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General 
Electric Co., 4 F. 2d 160 (SDNY, 1924); Jerome H. 
Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 16 F. 2d 829 
(SDNY, 1926); Associated Music Publishers, Inc., v. 
Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 141 F. 2d 852 (CA2, 1944) . 
Cf. Chappell & Co. v. Associated Radio Co. of Australia, 
Ltd., [ 1925 J Viet. L. R. 350; M essager v. British Broad-
casting Co., Ltd., [1927] 2 K. B. 543, rev'd on other 
grounds, [1928] 1 K . B. 660, aff'd, [1929] A. C. 151. See 
- -
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generally Caldwell, Broadcasting of Copyrighted Works, 
1 J . Air L. 584 (1930); Note, 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 549 
(1927); Note. 39 Harv. L. Rev. 269 (1925). 
If, by analogy to a live performance in a concert hall 
or cabaret, a radio station "performs" a musi~al com-
position when it broadcasts it, the same analogy would 
seem to require the conclusion that those who listen to 
the broadcast through the use of radio receivers do not 
perform the composition. And that is exactly what the 
early federal cases held. "Certainly those who listen 
do not perform, and therefore do not infringe." Jerome 
H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 16 F. 2d 829. 
"One who manually or by human agency merely actuates 
electrical instrumentalities, whereby inaudible elements 
that are omnipresent in the 1:tir are made audible to 
persons who are within hearing, does not 'perform' 
within the meaning of the Copyright Law." Buck v. 
Debaum, 40 F. 2d 734, 735 (SD Cal. 1929). 
Such was the state of the law when this Court in 1931 
decided Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191. 
In that case the Court was called upon to answer the 
following question certified by the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals: "Do the acts of a hotel proprietor, in making 
available to his guests, through the instrumentality of 
a radio receiving set and loud speakers installed in his 
hotel and under the control and for the entertainment 
of his guests, the hearing of a copyrighted musical compo-
sition which has been broadcast from a radio transmitting 
station, constitute a performance of such composition 
within the meaning of 17 USC, Sec. 1 ( e) ?" The Court 
answered the certified question in the affirmative. In 
stating the facts of the case, however, the Court's opinion 
made clear that the broadcaster of the musical composi-
tion was not licensed to perform it, and at least twice in 
the course of its opinion the Court indicated that the: 
- -
7 4-452-0PINION , 
10 TWENTIETH CENTURY -CORP. v. AIKE 
answer to the certified question might have been different 
if the broadcast it§elf had been authorized by the copy-
right holder.10 
We may assume f9r present purposes that the J ew·el.:. ( 
LaSalle decision r~t~ins. authoritative force in a factual 
situation like that in which it. arqse.11 But, as the Court 
of Appeals in this cas~ perceived, this Court has in two 
recent decisions expUcitly disavowed the view that the 
reception of an electrgnic broadcast can constitute a per-
formance, w en t e roa caster himself is licensed to 
periorrrl the copyrighted material that he broadcasts. 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 i Tele~ 
prompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394. 
The language of this Court's opinion in the Fortnightly 
-case could hardly be more explicitly dispositive of the 
question now before us: 
\ 
"The television broadcaster in one sense does less 
than the exhibitor.of a.motion picture or stage play; 
he supplies his audience not with visible images but 
only with electronic signals. The viewer conversely 
does more than a member of a theater audience; he 
provides the equipment to convert electronic signals 
into audible sound and visible images. Despite 
these deviations from the conventional situation 
contemplated by the framers of the Copyright Act, 
broadcasters have been Judicially treated as exhibi-
tors, and viewers as members of a theater audience. 
10 "[W]e have no occasion to determine under what circum-
i,tances a broadcaster will be held to be a performer, or the effect 
upon others of hi,s paying a license fee ." 283 U. S., at 198 (empha-
sis added) . See also 283 U. S., at 199 11. 5. 
11 The decision in Jeweli-LaSalle might be 8Upported by a con- l 
cept akm to that of contributory mfringement , even though there 
was no relatwnship between the broadcaster and the hotel company 
and, therefore, technically no question of actual contributory in-, 
frmgement in that c11se. 283 U. S., at 197 n. 4. 
- -
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Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform. 
Thus, while both broadcaster and viewer play crucial 
roles in the total television process, a line is drawn 
between them. One is treated as active performer; 
the other, as passive beneficiary." Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Art-ists, 392 U. S., at 398-399 (foot-
notes omitted) . 
The Fortnightly and Teleprompter cases, to be sure, 
involved television, not radio, and the copyrighted 
materials there in issue were literary and dramatic 
works, not musical compositions. But, as the Court of 
Appeals correctly observed, "[i]f Fortnightly with its 
elaborate CA TV plant and Teleprompter with its even 
more sophisticated and extended technological and pro-
gramming facilities was not 'performing,' then logic dic-
tates that no 'performance' resulted when the [respond-
ent] merely activated his restaurant radio." 500 F . 2d, 
at 137. 
To hold in this case that the respondent Aiken "per-
formed" the petitioners' copyrighted works would thus 
require us to overrule two very recent decisions of this 
Court. But such a holding would more than offend the 
principles of stare dee-is-is ; it would result in a regime of 
copyright law that would be both wholly unenforcible 
and highly inequitable. 
The practical unenforcibility of a ruling that all of 
those in Aiken's position are copyright infringers is self-
evident. One has only to consider the countless business 
establishments in this country with radio or television 
sets on their premises-bars and beauty shops, cafeterias 
and car washes, dentists' offices and drive-ins-to realize 
the total futility of any evenhanded effort on the part of 
copyright holders to license even a substantial percentage 
of them.12 
12 The Court of Appe-als observed that ASCAP now has licens~ 
- -
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And a ruling that a radio listener "performs" every 
broadcast that he receives would be highly inequitable 
for two distinct reasons. First, a person in Aiken's posi-
tion would have no sure way of protecting himself from 
liability for copyright infringement except by keeping his 
radio set turned off. For even if he secured a license 
from ASCAP, he would have no way of either foreseeing 
or controlling the broadcast of compositions whose copy-
right was held by someone else.10 Secondly, to hold that 
all in Aiken's position "performed" these musical com-
positions would be to authorize the sale of an untold 
agreements with some 5,150 business establishments in the whole 
· country, 500 F . 2d, at 129, noting that these include "firms which 
employ on premises sources for music such as tape recorders and 
live entertainment." Id., at n. 4. As a matter of so-called "policy" 
or "practice," we are told that ASCAP has not even tried to exact 
licensing agreements from commercial establishments whose radios 
have only a single speaker. 
13 This inequity, in the context of the decision in Buck v. Jewell-
LaJ3al,le ReaUy Co., 283 U. S. 191, was pointed out by Professor 
Zecheriah Chafee, Jr., 30 years ago: 
"A rule which is very hard for laymen to apply so as to keep clear 
of litigation was estabilshed by the LaJ3al,le Hotel case. The hotel 
was heavily liable if it rebroadcast unlicensed music, but how could 
it protect itself? Must it maintain a monitor always on the job to 
sit with a list before him pages long showing what pieces are licensed 
and turn off the master set the instant an unlicensed piece comes 
from the broadcasting? The dilemma thus created by the Copyright 
Act was mitigated for a time by the machinery of ASCAP, which 
was a device entirely outside the statute. The hotel could obtaiu 
a blanket license from ASCAP and thus be pretty sure of safety 
about all tl1e music which came through its master set . . . . [But] 
if any composer outside the ASCAP has his music broadcast, what 
is the hotel to do? Besides getting an ASCAP license, must the 
hotel bargain separately with every independent composer on the 
chance that his music may come through to the hotel patrons? 
"Such divergences from the ideal . . . are likely to be cor-
rected . ... " Reflections on the Law of Copyright I, 45 Colum. L. 
Rev. 503, 528-529. 
- -
7 4---452-0PINION 
TWENTIETH CENTURY CORP. v. AIKEN 13 
number of licenses for what is basically a single public 
rendition of a copyrighted work. Such overkill would go 
far beyond what is required for the economic protection 
of copyright owners,14 and the exaction of such multiple 
tribute would be wholly at odds with the balanced con-
gressional purpose behind 17 U. S. C. § 1 ( e) : 
"The main object to be desired in expanding copy-
right protection accorded to music has been to give 
to the composer an adequate return for the value of 
his composition, and it has been a serious and a 
difficult task to combine the protection of the com-
poser with the protection of the public, and to so 
frame an act that it would accomplish the double pur-
pose of securing to the composer an adequate return 
for all use made of his composition and at the same 
time prevent the formation of oppressive monopo-
lies, which might be founded upon the very rights 
granted to the composer for the purpose of protect-
ing his interests." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 
2d Sess., at 7 (1909). 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
MR. JusTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
14 The petitioners have not demonstrated that they cannot receive 
from a broadcaster adequate royalties based upon the total size of 
the broadcaster's audience. On the contrary, the respondent points 
out that generally copyright holders can and do receive royalties in 
proportion to advertising revenues of licensed broadcasters, and a 
broadcaster's advertising revenues reflect the total number of its· 
listeners , including those who listen to the broadcasts in public busi-
ness establishments. 
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